Andrii and I are starting a new Russia Influence Monitor to track and document Russian influence activity. This is meant to be a running record between investigations, and we hope it’s a useful way to surface patterns as they emerge.
Russia’s Influence Activity Monitor
Ukraine Warns of Possible Russian False-Flag Provocation
• Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service warned on Jan. 2 that Russian special services may be preparing a large-scale false-flag provocation with civilian casualties, potentially timed to Orthodox Christmas (Jan.7th). Ukrainian officials said any such attack could target a religious or other symbolically significant site and be followed by fabricated evidence presented as proof of Ukrainian and/or NATO involvement.
How this is used:
Russia has a long record of staging false-flag operations—often tied to symbolic targets or dates—ahead of invasions, escalatory attacks, or efforts to prop up proxy regimes, using terrorism and violence to shape the narrative first and assign blame before independent facts can be established.
Russia Selects Personal Back Channel Over U.S. Institutions
• Reporting indicates that the Kremlin deliberately chose Steve Witkoff, a longtime shady Trump confidant with no Russia experience, as its preferred U.S. channel, sidelining the CIA, career diplomats, and established diplomatic protocol. Russian outreach relied on personal relationships and third-country intermediaries rather than formal processes designed to provide oversight and manage risk.
How this is used:
Russia uses these tactics to bypass institutions and target selected individuals, eliminating oversight and lowering resistance to pressure, while financial relationships and deal-making create incentives that make individuals more receptive to promoting Kremlin interests.
AfD Accused of Gathering Information for Russia
• Lawmakers from Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) are using parliamentary inquiry powers to request detailed information about drone defenses, arms supply routes to Ukraine, and critical infrastructure. German security officials warn that while individual questions may appear routine, the cumulative effect could reveal sensitive information useful to Russian intelligence.
How this is used:
Rather than relying on spies alone, foreign influence efforts often exploit open institutions, legal processes, and sympathetic politicians to gather information at scale.
Russia Shifts Espionage Operations to Mexico
• U.S. officials say Russia has relocated senior intelligence officers to Mexico after mass expulsions across Europe and the United States, using diplomatic cover and third-country platforms to continue espionage operations targeting U.S. interests. Despite receiving a list of identified operatives from U.S. intelligence, Mexican authorities declined to expel them, allowing Russian services to operate with relatively limited scrutiny.
How this is used:
When pressure increases in one region, intelligence services often relocate operations to jurisdictions with weaker oversight or competing security priorities, preserving access while reducing risk.
Olga – I believe that these people were psychologically profiled and most of them have personality disorder issues so they’re quite easy to manipulate.
The entirety of the Russian “psychological warfare machine” is based on a cluster B manipulation model. It’s all just basic psychology, and I guess they don’t want people to know these basic issues in psychology and I guess most of us don’t care!
Anyway, with my basic knowledge of psychology, if I was going to use it for evil, I would do exactly what they do and pick the people that they have chosen – they use money and the promise of influence & power, to reel them in and then, while they are schmoozing them, I believe they start getting dirt on them and begin blackmailing them so they’re giving them money, influence, and power, but if they get out of line, they’ll take all that away with the black mail—
How can the president of Mexico allow Russia?